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I. INTRODUCTION 
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This matter comes on before this court on an appeal from 
orders the District Court1 entered on November 10, 2010, 
denying appellant Gray Holdco, Inc.’s (Gray) Motion to Stay 
Proceedings in the District Court pending the outcome of a 
separate arbitration proceeding of its claims against appellee 
Randy Cassady (Cassady) and granting Cassady’s Motion to 
Enjoin the same arbitration proceedings.  Gray made the 
arbitration demand more than ten months after it initiated this 
civil suit in the District Court on November 13, 2009, alleging 
that Cassady breached the employment contract between him 
and Gray and that Cassady and a new business venture that he 
established, RWLS, were interfering with Gray’s contractual 
relationships.2  On September 17, 2010, Gray, pursuant to an 
arbitration provision in an agreement between it and Cassady, 
filed the demand to arbitrate its claims against Cassady with the 
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”)  in Delaware and 
filed the Motion to Stay the Proceedings against Cassady in the 
District Court.3
                                                 
1 A magistrate judge entered all the District Court orders that we 
discuss in this opinion inasmuch as the parties consented to 
proceed before a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(i). 
  Cassady opposed the Motion to Stay and filed 
 
2 In certain portions of the record and in appellant’s brief 
“RWLS” sometimes is referred to as “Renegade.” 
 
3  RWLS is not a party to the arbitration agreement and it and 
Cassady were distinct parties represented by different attorneys 
in the District Court.  Moreover, Cassady’s attorneys filed an 
appellee’s brief on this appeal only on behalf of Cassady, and, 
although RWLS’s attorneys have filed an appearance on the 
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the Motion to Enjoin the arbitration proceedings arguing that 
Gray, through its initiation and pursuit of this litigation in the 
District Court, waived the right to enforce the arbitration 
agreement.  Inasmuch as we agree with the District Court that 
Gray waived its right to enforce the arbitration agreement, we 
will affirm the Court’s orders.    
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In June 2006, Cassady began work for Gray’s second-tier 
operating subsidiary, Gray Wireline Service, Inc. (Gray 
Wireline), a cased-hole wireline business, as a manager of its 
facility in Granbury, Texas.  Gray alleges that, as part of 
Cassady’s employment agreement with Gray Wireline, he 
agreed to an “Option Agreement” with “certain restrictive 
covenants” which prohibited him from: (1) misusing Gray 
Wireline’s confidential information; (2) engaging in business 
while still an employee of Gray Wireline; (3) competing with 
Gray Wireline for two years after the end of his employment 
with Gray Wireline; and (4) soliciting Gray Wireline employees 
for one year following the end of his employment relationship 
with Gray Wireline.  App. at 74-77.  Gray Wireline also alleges 
that an additional agreement between Gray and Cassady, entitled 
the 2006 New Hire Stock Option Plan, contains the following 
arbitration provision: 
SECTION 13.  ARBITRATION.  Any dispute or 
                                                                                                             
appeal, RWLS is not participating in this appeal. 
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controversy between the Company and a 
Participant, arising out of or relating to this Plan 
or the Participant’s Option Agreement, the breach 
of this Plan or the Participant’s Option 
Agreement, or otherwise, shall be settled by 
arbitration in Wilmington, Delaware administered 
by the American Arbitration Association in 
accordance with its Commercial Rules then in 
effect and judgment on the award rendered by the 
arbitrator may be entered in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof. . . . [E]ither party may, 
without inconsistency with this arbitration 
provision, apply to any court having jurisdiction 
over such dispute or controversy and seek interim 
provisional, injunctive or other equitable relief 
until the arbitration award is rendered or the 
controversy is otherwise resolved. 
Id. at 70-71.4
In March 2009, Gray Wireline promoted Cassady to 
 
                                                 
4 We recognize that Cassady denies that the 2006 New Hire 
Stock Option Plan ever was enforceable against him, though we 
do not address that contention.  We also note that the parties on 
this appeal make no distinction between Gray and Gray Wireline 
with respect either to the entity employing Cassady or to the 
party to their agreements with Cassady and thus, in effect, they 
treat Gray and Gray Wireline as a single entity.  In these 
circumstances, we similarly are treating Gray and Gray Wireline 
as a single entity, as, indeed, did the District Court. 
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District Manager of its facility in New Kensington, 
Pennsylvania, and in July 2009, Cassady rose to the position of 
Region Manager of Gray Wireline’s operations in Pennsylvania, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi.  According to Gray, on September 
21, 2009, Cassady resigned his position at Gray Wireline and 
formed RWLS, an entity that competed with Gray in the cased-
hole wireline business.  Gray also alleges that Cassady solicited 
multiple Gray Wireline employees to join RWLS and solicited 
Gray Wireline customers to transfer their business to RWLS.      
    
 On November 13, 2009, Gray filed the complaint in this 
action in the District Court against Cassady and RWLS, 
asserting that Cassady breached the Option Agreement and 
tortiously interfered with Gray’s existing contractual 
relationships.  The complaint also asserted claims of unjust 
enrichment and civil conspiracy based on Cassady and RWLS’s 
solicitation of Gray clients and employees.  The complaint 
primarily requested injunctive relief although it also sought 
money damages.  Significantly, the complaint did not mention 
the arbitration agreement in the New Hire Stock Option Plan or 
include any arbitration clause in the employment agreement 
labeled as “Exhibit A” which Gray attached to the complaint.  
On the same day that Gray filed the complaint, it filed a motion 
for a preliminary injunction against both defendants, requesting 
that the Court enjoin them from, among other things, soliciting 
Gray’s customers and employees. 
 On November 17, 2009, Gray filed a motion for 
expedited discovery which the District Court granted the next 
day.  An attorney representing RWLS filed an appearance in the 
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District Court on November 20, 2009, and a separate attorney 
representing Cassady filed an appearance on November 25, 
2009.  Cassady and RWLS then filed a joint motion opposing 
expedited discovery.  On December 4, 2009, the Court 
conducted a discovery conference during which the parties 
agreed to a discovery schedule and the Court set the dates for 
hearing the application for a preliminary injunction as January 
12-13, 2010.   
 The parties intensely litigated the preliminary injunction 
proceedings.  In the discovery Gray served 15 requests for the 
production of documents and 11 interrogatories and deposed 
Cassady and a corporate representative of RWLS.  Cassady 
propounded 118 requests for production of documents and 
RWLS propounded 15 requests for production of documents, 7 
requests for admissions, and 13 interrogatories.  The District 
Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary 
injunction application and on January 13, 2010, following the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court filed an opinion setting 
forth its conclusion that Gray did not meet its burden to establish 
that it was entitled to injunctive relief under Federal Rule Civil 
Procedure 65.  In its conclusion, the Court, inter alia, held “as a 
matter of law, that the agreement entered into between Cassady 
and the plaintiff is not enforceable” and that “the plaintiff has 
not demonstrated that it will likely succeed on the merits.”  Gray 
Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, Civ. No. 2:09-cv-1519, 2010 WL 
235106, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2010) (Gray I).  Consequently, 
the Court denied Gray’s motion for a preliminary injunction.     
 On March 2, 2010, the parties filed a Federal Rule Civil 
Procedure 26(f) discovery report and a proposed discovery plan. 
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 On March 9, 2010, the District Court conducted a status 
conference and set deadlines for mediation and for filing 
motions for judgment on the pleadings.  On March 19, 2010, 
Cassady and RWLS separately moved for judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) or, in the alternative, 
to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), with 
Cassady asserting that the Court’s findings at the preliminary 
injunction hearing were “law of the case” and barred Gray’s 
claims as a matter of law and RWLS asserting that Gray did not 
suffer any damage as a result of Cassady’s alleged contract 
breach.  As a matter of convenience we will refer to the motions 
simply as motions to dismiss.  Gray filed a brief opposing the 
motions to dismiss.  On June 8, 2010, the Court held another 
status conference and established discovery deadlines and on 
June 30, 2010, the Court denied Cassady’s and RWLS’s motions 
to dismiss.   
On September 17, 2010, after obtaining a new attorney, 
Gray filed a demand for arbitration against Cassady with the 
AAA in Delaware.  Gray based the demand on the arbitration 
clause included in the New Hire Stock Option Plan that we 
already have quoted.  Then, on September 21, 2010, Cassady 
filed a motion in the District Court to enjoin the arbitration and 
to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  In the motion, 
Cassady argued that Gray waived its right to arbitrate by 
participating in substantial litigation and discovery in the 
District Court and by acting inconsistently with its later action 
seeking to enforce its right to arbitrate.  The following day Gray 
filed a motion pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 
U.S.C. § 1 et seq., in the District Court to stay the judicial 
proceedings as to Cassady pending the outcome of the Delaware 
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arbitration.  Gray argued that the arbitration agreement was 
mutual and enforceable and that Cassady could not demonstrate 
the necessary prejudice arising from Gray’s participation in the 
litigation to justify the Court to hold that it waived its right to 
arbitrate.  Cassady opposed the motion and renewed its 
argument that Gray waived its right to enforce the arbitration 
provision and also contended that the provision was not 
enforceable against him.    
 The District Court granted Cassady’s motion to enjoin the 
arbitration and denied Gray’s motion to stay the proceedings 
pending arbitration.  It did not, however, impose sanctions 
against Gray.  In its opinion accompanying its orders, the Court 
determined that three of the six non-exclusive factors we 
outlined in Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912 
(3d Cir. 1992), for determining whether a party has waived its 
right to arbitrate weighed in favor of finding waiver, one factor 
weighed against finding waiver, and two factors were neutral.  
Gray Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, Civ. No. 2:09-cv-1519, 2010 WL 
4687744, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2010) (Gray II).  Inasmuch 
as the Court found that Gray waived its right to enforce the 
arbitration provision, it did not decide whether in the absence of 
the waiver the arbitration provision would have been 
enforceable.  Gray filed a notice of appeal challenging the 
Court’s denial of its request for a stay and granting Cassady’s 
request to enjoin the arbitration proceedings.       
 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction over this diversity of 
citizenship action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).  Although, 
generally, with exceptions not applicable here, we only have 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from district courts’ final orders, we 
have jurisdiction in this case under the FAA to hear an appeal 
from the District Court’s order denying a request to stay the 
proceedings pending arbitration and granting Cassady’s request 
to enjoin the arbitration proceedings.  See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(2); 
Zimmer v. CooperNeff Advisors, Inc., 523 F.3d 224, 228 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)).                                
 We exercise plenary review over both “questions of law 
concerning the applicability and scope of arbitration 
agreements” and whether a party “through its litigation conduct, 
waived its right to compel arbitration.”  Nino v. Jewelry Exch., 
Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  To the extent that a district court makes 
factual findings in making these determinations, we review its 
findings for clear error.  Id. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 The FAA provides that: 
A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing 
a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
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law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2.  The Supreme Court has stated that this provision 
reflects a “‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.’”  AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) 
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941 (1983)).  Thus “any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is 
the construction of the contract language itself or any allegation 
of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”  Moses H. 
Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. at 941; see also Volt Info. 
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 476, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1254 (1989) (“There is no 
federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of 
procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the 
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to 
arbitrate.”).  Given this strong preference to enforce private 
arbitration agreements, we will not infer lightly that a party has 
waived its right to arbitrate and we will find that a party has 
waived the right “only where the demand for arbitration came 
long after the suit commenced and when both parties had 
engaged in extensive discovery.”  PaineWebber Inc. v. Faragalli, 
61 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).   
We also have held that a party seeking arbitration may 
waive its right to arbitration when the party opposing the 
arbitration demonstrates sufficient prejudice arising from the 
delay of the party seeking arbitration in making its demand.  
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 223 (3d Cir. 
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2007).  To that end, in Hoxworth we identified six non-
exclusive factors to guide the prejudice inquiry: (1) timeliness or 
lack thereof of the motion to arbitrate; (2) extent to which the 
party seeking arbitration has contested the merits of the 
opposing party’s claims; (3) whether the party seeking 
arbitration informed its adversary of its intent to pursue 
arbitration prior to seeking to enjoin the court proceedings; (4) 
the extent to which a party seeking arbitration engaged in non-
merits motion practice; (5) the party’s acquiescence to the 
court’s pretrial orders; and (6) the extent to which the parties 
have engaged in discovery.  Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 926-27.  
While these factors generally are indicative of whether a party 
opposing arbitration would suffer prejudice attributable to the 
other party’s delay in seeking arbitration, the answer to the 
question of whether a party invoking the arbitration clause 
waived its right to arbitrate is necessarily case specific and thus 
depends on the circumstances and context of each case.  Nino, 
609 F.3d at 209.    
The District Court determined that in a Hoxworth 
analysis the first and last factors were neutral, the fourth factor 
weighed against finding waiver and the remaining three factors 
weighed in favor of finding a waiver.  We will consider each 
factor separately but first we will consider Gray’s overarching 
argument that we should not factor its conduct in pursuing 
litigation seeking a preliminary injunction into our Hoxworth 
prejudice analysis.  We point out that our weighing of the 
Hoxworth factors involves an analysis that goes beyond merely 
counting the factors for or against finding a waiver. 
A. “No Waiver” Clause 
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The arbitration agreement on which Gray relies contains 
a disclaimer that “either party may, without inconsistency with 
this arbitration provision, apply to any court having jurisdiction 
over such dispute or controversy and seek interim provisional, 
injunctive or other equitable relief until the arbitration award is 
rendered or the controversy is otherwise resolved.” App. at 71.  
Gray argues that this provision precluded the District Court from 
considering its actions in pursuing litigation seeking a 
preliminary injunction in its analysis of the Hoxworth factors.  
The District Court disagreed and held that while Gray’s pursuit 
of injunctive relief did not waive its right to arbitrate, neither did 
the “no waiver” clause act as a shield against a possible finding 
that Gray waived that right.  Gray II, 2010 WL 4687744, at *3.5
We agree with the District Court that the clause in the 
New Hire Stock Option Plan allowing either party to seek 
injunctive relief until the arbitration award is rendered does not 
override the applicability of the Hoxworth multipart analysis 
which examines whether a party, by its participation in 
litigation, has waived its right to invoke arbitration.  Thus, we 
 
 Gray contends that the District Court, by factoring the 
preliminary injunction proceedings into its Hoxworth waiver 
analysis, refused to enforce Gray’s agreement with Cassady 
insofar as that agreement allowed Gray to apply for injunctive 
relief without waiving its right to arbitration.   
                                                 
5 Cassady disputes the characterization of the clause in the New 
Hire Stock Option Plan as a “no waiver” clause.  We, however, 
do not find its characterization significant as we are concerned 
with the content of the clause rather than its characterization. 
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also agree with the holding in S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona 
Trucking, Inc., 159 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1998), “that the 
presence of a ‘no waiver’ clause does not alter the ordinary 
analysis undertaken to determine if a party has waived its right 
to arbitration.”  
Gray distinguishes Latona Trucking by first arguing that 
the court in that case interpreted a “no waiver” clause6
In Ortho Pharmaceutical we indicated “that a district 
court has the authority to grant injunctive relief in an arbitrable 
 to allow a 
party seeking arbitration “to seek provisional remedies or other 
judicial proceedings that would not function to displace 
arbitration on the underlying dispute.”  Appellant’s br. at 19 
(quoting Latona Trucking, 159 F.3d at 85).  Gray then argues 
that inasmuch as the appellant in Latona Trucking had not 
sought a preliminary injunction, which Gray categorizes as 
provisional relief, “the holding of Latona Trucking does not 
support the district court’s conclusion that it could construct a 
finding of waiver based on Gray’s efforts to secure a preliminary 
injunction.”  Id.  Gray also argues that the District Court’s 
decision to take its pursuit of a preliminary injunction into 
consideration in its waiver analysis was inconsistent with our 
opinion in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 
806 (3d Cir. 1989). 
                                                 
6 The “no waiver” clause in Latona Trucking was an AAA rule 
incorporated into the parties’ contract stating that: “No judicial 
proceeding by a party relating to the subject matter of the 
arbitration shall be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to 
arbitrate.”  Latona Trucking, 159 F.3d at 85. 
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dispute, provided that the traditional prerequisites for such relief 
are satisfied.”  Id. at 812.  Yet we only were holding that a 
district court’s action in exercising its equitable powers to grant 
a preliminary injunction was not inconsistent with the FAA and 
that a party does not waive its right to seek a preliminary 
injunction by entering into an arbitration agreement.  Id.  We did 
not address the distinct question of whether a party’s conduct in 
pursuit of the preliminary injunction may establish prejudice in 
the context of an arbitration waiver inquiry.  Moreover, while 
Latona Trucking did not involve a preliminary injunction, its 
rationale is applicable to this case: a party should not be allowed 
to delay its demand for arbitration and use federal court 
proceedings to “‘test[] the water before taking [a] swim.’”  159 
F.3d at 86 (quoting Home Gas Corp. of Mass., Inc. v. Walter’s 
of Hadley, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ma. 1989)) (first 
alteration in original).  In other words, “the fact that an 
arbitration agreement incorporates [a no waiver clause] would 
not prevent a court from finding that a party has waived 
arbitration by actively participating in protracted litigation of an 
arbitrable dispute.”  Id. at 85.   
We disagree with Gray’s argument that the District 
Court, through its consideration of the proceedings on the 
preliminary injunction application in its Hoxworth analysis, 
nullified the contractual provision allowing either party, without 
inconsistency with the arbitration provision, to pursue injunctive 
relief.  To the contrary, the Court specifically recognized Gray’s 
contractual right to apply for injunctive relief and honored that 
provision by not weighing its participation in discovery related 
to the application in determining whether Gray waived the right 
to arbitration.  Gray II, 2010 WL 4687744, at *4.   
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Nevertheless, like the District Court, we think that the 
contractual no waiver provision does not require a court to 
disregard completely Gray’s conduct in pursuit of the 
preliminary injunction.  Adopting Gray’s position that any 
conduct in pursuit of a preliminary injunction is exempt from a 
prejudice inquiry could allow a party, under the guise of seeking 
a preliminary injunction, to conduct discovery which would not 
be allowed in arbitration proceedings.  See, e.g., Zwitserse 
Maatschappij Van Levensverzekering En Lijfrente v. ABN Int’l 
Capital Mkts. Corp., 996 F.2d 1478, 1480 (2d Cir. 1993) (per 
curiam) (holding that taking deposition of witnesses not 
available in arbitration proceedings is sufficient prejudice to find 
waiver of right to arbitrate); St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, 
Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 591 (7th Cir. 
1992) (“By delaying its demand for arbitration, Disco was able 
to obtain discovery it would not necessarily have been entitled to 
in an arbitration proceeding.”).7
More fundamentally, in addition to addressing the 
important question of whether the non-moving party suffers 
prejudice from the moving party’s delay in invoking an 
arbitration clause, a court, by finding that there has been a 
waiver of the right to arbitrate predicated on a party’s litigation 
conduct, effectuates the principle that a party may not use 
arbitration to manipulate the legal process and in that process 
waste scarce judicial resources.  See, e.g., Republic Ins. Co. v. 
          
                                                 
7 As Gray points out, Cassady does not claim that he was 
prejudiced in this manner.  However, the cases above 
demonstrate why we will not adopt the position which Gray 
advocates.  
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PAICO Receivables, LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a “no waiver” clause does not override district 
court’s inherent authority to control its own docket and to find 
that a party, through extensive litigation, has waived its right to 
arbitrate); Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A. G. Edwards & 
Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“To give 
Edwards a second bite at the very questions presented to the 
court for disposition squarely confronts the policy that 
arbitration may not be used as a strategy to manipulate the legal 
process.”).  For example, if faced with a contract that stated that 
neither party implicitly would waive the right to arbitrate by 
engaging in extensive litigation inconsistent with that right a 
court would not need to dispense completely with a prejudice 
inquiry in analyzing whether one of the parties, through its 
pursuit of litigation, did, indeed, waive the right to arbitration.  
See Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 39:36 (4th ed. 
2000) (“The general view is that a party to a written contract can 
waive a provision of that contract by conduct expressly or 
surrounding performance, despite the existence of a so-called 
anti-waiver or ‘failure to enforce’ clause in the contract.”).   
Therefore, while Gray’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction in itself does not factor into the waiver inquiry, the 
question for purposes of finding an arbitration waiver remains 
whether Gray, through its litigation conduct, waived its right to 
compel arbitration because of the prejudice Cassady suffered 
attributable to Gray’s delay in invoking its right to arbitrate.  See 
Nino, 609 F.3d at 209.  In answering that question, we find that 
it is appropriate to consider Gray’s litigation conduct as a whole, 
including its conduct in its pursuit of a preliminary injunction.   
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B. Timeliness 
Gray filed its complaint and motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief against Cassady in the District Court on 
November 13, 2009, but did not file its demand for arbitration 
with the AAA until September 17, 2010.  Though, at least 
insofar as we are aware, Gray did not explain to the District 
Court its reason for the delay, the Court nevertheless held that 
Gray’s ten-month delay, while “questionable,” neither weighed 
in favor of nor against finding that Gray waived its right to 
arbitrate.  Gray II, 2010 WL 4687744, at *3.  Gray argues that 
the District Court nevertheless erroneously counted the time it 
spent litigating the preliminary injunction against it and ignored 
the fact that the parties did not actively pursue the litigation 
following the preliminary injunction hearing.8
 In considering the timeliness question we first reject 
Gray’s contention that the Court should have disregarded the 
time that Gray was seeking a preliminary injunction.  In this 
regard, we point out that there was no reason why Gray could 
not have demanded arbitration while it was seeking the 
preliminary injunction as there is no rule precluding a party from 
simultaneously traveling on both procedural avenues.  Indeed, 
Gray does not suggest that it could not have sought a 
preliminary injunction and demanded arbitration  in parallel 
proceedings.   
 
                                                 
8 As we discuss below, we do not agree with Gray’s contention 
that, after the preliminary injunction hearing, the parties were 
not engaged actively in litigation. 
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In any event, while we agree with the District Court that 
the ten-month period between Gray’s initiation of the lawsuit in 
the District Court and its initiation of arbitration with the AAA 
is not, standing alone, outcome determinative on the waiver 
issue here, see Zimmer 523 F.3d at 232, the ten-month delay is 
substantially longer than the delays we have encountered in 
cases where we have not found a waiver of the right to arbitrate 
on a delay basis.  See Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 
588, 598 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that 38-day delay, while not 
determinative, did not establish waiver where opponent of 
arbitration had not demonstrated prejudice);  Wood v. Prudential 
Ins. Co., 207 F.3d 674, 680 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that short 
delay of one-and-a-half months and lack of significant steps in 
litigation that could have caused prejudice to plaintiff counseled 
against finding waiver); Faragalli, 61 F.3d at 1069 (waiver not 
found after two-month delay with no showing of prejudice); 
Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H. F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777, 783-84 
(3d Cir. 1975) (holding that defendant did not waive right to 
arbitrate where it moved for stay pending arbitration 
immediately after removing case to federal court).   
The foregoing cases should be contrasted to cases in 
which, after a party delayed seeking arbitration, we have found 
that it waived its right to arbitrate.  These cases in which we 
found a waiver featured delays which were closer to ten months, 
the period of delay here.  Thus, in Hoxworth itself we found a 
waiver following a more than 11-month delay where the party 
seeking the finding that there had been a waiver participated in 
numerous pretrial proceedings and engaged in extensive 
discovery.  980 F.2d at 925-27.  And in Nino we found that a 
15-month delay weighed in favor of a finding of waiver.  609 
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F.3d at 210.  Thus, in Nino we found that the first Hoxworth 
factor weighed in favor of finding that there was a waiver where 
the delay was significant and the explanations for its delay by 
the party seeking arbitration were unpersuasive.  Id.  It is 
significant that, at least to the best of our knowledge, Gray 
offered no explanation to the District Court for its delay in 
waiting ten months after filing suit in the District Court before 
seeking enforcement of the arbitration provision and that it 
certainly has not offered such an explanation on this appeal.9
Overall, we are satisfied that while the length of the time 
between when a party initiates or first participates in litigation 
and when it seeks to enforce an arbitration clause is not 
dispositive in a waiver inquiry, in this case this factor weighs in 
favor of finding waiver.   
   
                                                 
9 In his answering brief Cassady suggests that the explanation 
for Gray’s delay is that Gray made a “tactical decision” to seek 
arbitration after it failed in its attempt to secure preliminary 
injunctive relief and then switched attorneys.  Appellee’s br. at 
27.  Though it had the opportunity to do so when it filed its reply 
brief, Gray has not contended that Cassady’s explanation was 
incorrect.  Even though we will not speculate on why Gray 
waited ten months after filing this litigation to demand 
arbitration of its dispute with Cassady, we cannot help but note 
that it appears that Gray’s complaint was significantly weakened 
after the District Court held in denying the preliminary 
injunction application that “as a matter of law . . . the agreement 
entered into between Cassady and the plaintiff is not 
enforceable.”  Gray I, 2010 WL 235106, at *5.  This point could 
not have been lost on Gray. 
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C. Gray’s contesting of Cassady’s claims  
The second Hoxworth factor is the degree to which the 
party seeking to compel arbitration has contested the merits of 
its opponent’s claims.  The wording of this factor as usually set 
forth suggests that the factor is immaterial in this case because 
Cassady has not filed any counterclaims against Gray and thus 
there was no litigation in which Gray would have had reason to 
contest any claim against it.  In Hoxworth we formulated this 
factor in the way we did because in Hoxworth, as in most cases 
in which there is an arbitration demand after the initiation of 
litigation, the defendant invokes an arbitration provision after 
the plaintiff files the court action.  See, e.g., Gavlik, 526 F.2d at 
780.  But this case is unusual because Gray both initiated this 
litigation and, more than ten months later, invoked the right to 
arbitrate the claims it already had advanced judicially.  
Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court that a literal 
reading of this factor would support Gray’s attempt to avoid 
scrutiny of its litigation activity in a Hoxworth analysis.  
Accordingly, to make the factor germane here, we, like the 
District Court, will apply this factor by examining the degree to 
which Gray participated in substantive legal proceedings and 
“has pursued or challenged the legal positions and arguments 
advanced by the respective parties [in this litigation].”  Gray II, 
2010 WL 4687744, at *3.  
The District Court held that this factor weighed strongly 
in favor of waiver inasmuch as Gray “participated in 
considerable legal action, no matter its context, related to the 
substantive merits of the underlying lawsuit.”  Id.  Specifically, 
the Court pointed to the fact that in pursuit of a preliminary 
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injunction motion Gray called four witnesses, cross-examined 
five witnesses, and introduced numerous exhibits into evidence. 
 Moreover, the Court noted that Gray filed briefs opposing 
Cassady’s and RWLS’s motions to dismiss.10
Gray first argues that the District Court’s consideration of 
its pursuit of a preliminary injunction will “eviscerate” our 
holding in Ortho Pharmaceutical because every preliminary 
injunction proceeding necessarily entails an inquiry into whether 
a “movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the 
merits.”  Appellant’s br. at 25 (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union 
v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (identifying 
probability of success on merits as requirement to obtaining 
preliminary injunction)).  This argument is without force for in a 
preliminary injunction proceeding a district court analyzes a 
movant’s likelihood of success on the merits of its claims 
without affecting the movant’s ability later to arbitrate those 
claims if the movant files its motion for a preliminary injunction 
when it already has sought to arbitrate the dispute.  Indeed, this 
was the exact scenario we addressed in Ortho Pharmaceutical, 
882 F.2d at 809.  Even where the party moving for a preliminary 
injunction does so before filing for arbitration, it can avoid 
waiving its right to arbitrate by notifying the opposing party of 
  Gray argues that 
the District Court erred because it considered Gray’s conduct 
during the preliminary injunction proceedings, and because it 
erroneously considered its defense against Cassady’s motion to 
dismiss Gray’s allegations.   
                                                 
10 Of course, Gray’s opposition to RWLS’s motion is immaterial 
inasmuch as the Gray-RWLS dispute was not subject to 
arbitration. 
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its intent to invoke arbitration in the future.  Here, Gray did 
neither, and thus the District Court did not err in considering 
Gray’s conduct during the proceedings on its preliminary 
injunction application in analyzing the second Hoxworth factor.  
The District Court also properly considered Gray’s 
opposition to Cassady’s motion to dismiss in the waiver 
analysis.  Gray argues that this Hoxworth factor should not 
apply to a moving party’s defense against a motion to dismiss 
because it is intended to prevent a movant from getting a second 
bite at the apple by filing a motion to dismiss and then filing a 
motion to compel arbitration if the motion to dismiss is not 
successful.  Of course, it is ironical that Gray makes this two-
bite argument because here it is Gray that is seeking a second 
bite by seeking arbitration after it failed in its attempt to secure a 
preliminary injunction.  In that regard, we note that when it 
sought arbitration Gray knew that the District Court already had 
held “as a matter of law, that the agreement entered into 
between Cassady and the plaintiff is not enforceable.”  Gray I, 
2010 WL 235106, at *5.  Thus it is not difficult to find prejudice 
where a party, such as Gray, is allowed to test out the merits of 
its case in a preliminary injunction application but then resorts to 
arbitration when it becomes apparent that the court regards its 
case as standing on weak footing.  In any event, as we stated in 
Nino, the focus of this factor is whether a party engaged “in 
motion practice on the merits prior to moving to compel 
arbitration.”  Nino, 609 F.3d at 210-11.  By responding to 
Cassady’s motion to dismiss, Gray undoubtedly engaged in 
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motion practice on the merits of the dispute.11
 Therefore, like the District Court, we find that this factor 
weighs in favor of finding waiver.   
 
 D. Gray’s Late Notification to Cassady of Its Intent to 
                       Arbitrate  
The third factor in the Hoxworth balancing test asks 
whether Gray informed Cassady of its intent to seek arbitration 
before it filed its motion to stay the District Court proceedings.  
980 F.2d at 926-27.  The Court held that this factor weighed 
heavily in favor of finding waiver inasmuch as Gray notified 
Cassady of its intent to arbitrate on September 17, 2010, the 
same day that it filed its demand for arbitration with the AAA.  
Gray acknowledges that it did not provide Cassady with earlier 
notice of its intent to arbitrate but argues that this factor should 
be neutral because Cassady has not shown that it suffered any 
prejudice from Gray’s failure to provide earlier notice.  
                                                 
11 We point out that one might have expected that Gray would 
have moved to compel arbitration as soon as Cassady filed his 
motion to dismiss if Gray had an intent at that time to seek 
arbitration later.  After all, if Gray had that intent at the time 
Cassady filed the motion to dismiss it would seem that it would 
have been almost reckless for it not to have demanded 
arbitration when it received the motion because if the District 
Court granted the motion and Gray later demanded arbitration 
Cassady undoubtedly would have raised the preclusive effect of 
the Court’s order in the arbitration proceedings. 
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We reject Gray’s argument that Cassady has not suffered 
any prejudice due to Gray’s failure to provide notice of its intent 
to arbitrate in this case.  In the arbitration waiver context we 
have recognized two distinct types of prejudice: substantive 
legal prejudice and prejudice a party suffers due to the 
unnecessary delay and expense of having to litigate a case that 
an arbitrator later decides.  See Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 224.  A 
showing of either type of prejudice is sufficient for a party 
objecting to arbitration to prevail in the waiver inquiry.  Id.   
 Gray argues that the case was dormant and “there was 
literally no activity going on” for much of the ten months 
between Gray’s initiation of the proceedings in the District 
Court and its demand for arbitration.  Appellant’s br. at 27.  
However, we have stated that “a party’s capacity to develop a 
litigation strategy with regard to the likelihood of arbitration 
diminishes the longer the case is litigated with no . . . indication 
that a motion to compel arbitration is forthcoming.”  Nino, 609 
F.3d at 211.  In Nino, we held that even though the party seeking 
arbitration included mandatory arbitration as one of the ten 
affirmative defenses in its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint, 
the third Hoxworth factor weighed in favor of finding a waiver 
of the right to arbitrate because the significance of the notice 
diminished the longer the defendant delayed in moving to 
compel arbitration.  Id. at 211-12.  Specifically, we stated that 
notice of arbitration could change a party’s approach to 
discovery as well as its litigation strategy based on whether it 
could recover attorney’s fees.  Id. at 211.    
Between the time the District Court denied preliminary 
injunctive relief and Gray filed its notice of arbitration, Cassady 
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filed a motion to dismiss,12 the parties set a discovery schedule 
and submitted a Rule 26(f) discovery plan, the District Court 
held status conferences, and the parties participated in 
mandatory mediation.  Cassady argues that during these 
proceedings, it conducted its defense preparation “with the 
understanding and reasonable expectation . . . that the parties’ 
entire dispute would be resolved by a jury in a single trial 
conducted in the District Court.”13
In addition to substantive legal prejudice, Cassady also 
argues that he had to expend considerable time and money to 
educate his attorney to defend him in preparation for a trial in 
the District Court.  Cassady further points out that the threat to 
his livelihood “likely will be outstanding . . . in excess of two 
  Appellees’ br. at 39.  
Therefore, Gray’s failure to notify Cassady of its intent to seek 
arbitration substantively has prejudiced Cassady’s approach to 
this case.  
                                                 
12 Of course, RWLS filed a similar motion but we are not 
considering it in our analysis. 
 
13 Notwithstanding Cassady’s expectations, even if we disregard 
the possibility of a resolution of this case on a summary 
judgment motion, in which event there will not be a trial in this 
case, we can see two possible reasons why this case might not 
be resolved by a jury:  (1) as a matter of law the District Court 
might hold that there is no right to a jury trial inasmuch as Gray 
in its complaint primarily was seeking injunctive relief; and (2) 
the District Court might rule that Cassady waived its right to a 
jury trial in its agreement with Gray.  We have no need to 
address those possibilities now. 
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years—far longer than necessary if Gray Holdco had remained 
committed to its originally selected forum . . . .”  Appellee’s br. 
at 45.  We agree that the time and expense that Cassady incurred 
in opposing Gray’s suit and the resulting delay weigh in favor of 
finding waiver. 
In reaching our conclusion, we have no doubt that 
Cassady has expended considerable resources in defending 
against Gray’s lawsuit.  Even setting aside the discovery during 
the preliminary injunction phase of the litigation, Cassady has 
had to retain counsel to represent him in this litigation for 
several months.  While Gray argues that after the District Court 
denied its application for a preliminary injunction the case was 
“dormant” and there was “literally no activity going on,” 
(appellant’s br. at 27-28) a review of the record demonstrates 
that this characterization is inaccurate.  As we have discussed, 
the District Court held three status conferences, and the parties 
filed a Rule 26(f) discovery report and attended a court ordered 
mediation hearing.  At all of these proceedings the clock on 
Cassady’s legal bill undoubtedly was running and, as Cassady 
points out, should the dispute proceed to arbitration under the 
New Hire Stock Option Plan he will be responsible for one-half 
of the professional fees and costs of the arbitrators.  App. at 71.  
Thus, we cannot ignore the legal expenses Cassady incurred 
while Gray sat on its arbitration rights, expenses which would be 
compounded if the District Court did not enjoin the Delaware 
arbitration.  See, e.g., Cotton v. Slone, 4 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 
1993) (“Slone’s conduct has imposed unnecessary expense and 
delay on Cotton, which would be compounded if she were now 
required to arbitrate her claim.”). 
 
 29 
 Second, Cassady makes a compelling argument that 
Gray’s claims, which present a substantial threat to his 
livelihood, now have been outstanding for over two years 
(including during this appeal) due to Gray’s delay in invoking 
the arbitration clause.  When Gray filed its motion to arbitrate, 
the end of discovery was in sight and the parties would have 
been ready to file dispositive motions or to proceed to trial.  If 
the District Court had granted Gray’s motion to compel 
arbitration, the proceedings would have started again in a 
different forum, requiring the parties, at least to some degree, to 
duplicate the efforts they expended in the District Court and thus 
frustrating the fundamental purposes underlying arbitration: 
[A]rbitration is meant to streamline the 
proceedings, lower costs, and conserve private 
and judicial resources, and it furthers none of 
those purposes when a party actively litigates a 
case for an extended period only to belatedly 
assert that the dispute should have been arbitrated, 
not litigated, in the first place. 
Nino, 609 F.3d at 209. 
 Due to Gray’s delay in invoking the arbitration clause, 
this proceeding has not conserved private or judicial resources 
and it has been anything but streamlined.  We thus agree that 
Gray’s failure to notify Cassady of its intent to arbitrate weighs 
heavily in favor of finding waiver.   
 E. Extent of Non-Merits Motion Practice 
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 The District Court found that there had not been 
significant non-merits motion practice between Gray and 
Cassady and, therefore, this factor weighed against finding a 
waiver of Gray’s right to arbitrate.  Neither Gray nor Cassady 
argues that the District Court erred in its analysis of this factor 
and, therefore, we adopt the District Court’s finding that this 
factor counsels against finding that Gray waived its right to 
arbitrate. 
 F. Gray’s Acquiescence to Pre-Trial Orders 
 The fifth Hoxworth factor asks to what extent a party 
“assent[ed] to the district court’s pretrial orders.”  980 F.2d at 
927.  The District Court found that Gray assented to its orders 
because it attended three status conferences, filed a Rule 26(f) 
discovery report, attended a court-ordered mediation, established 
discovery deadlines, including time limits for experts’ reports 
and depositions, and then, eight days prior to filing for 
arbitration, requested and received extensions of time to 
complete discovery.   Furthermore, Gray does not contend that it 
objected to participating in any of these proceedings.  Gray 
argues that the District Court’s holding ignores the circumstance 
that there would have been status conferences regardless of 
when Gray filed its motion to compel arbitration because the 
litigation in the District Court would have continued against 
RWLS even if there was arbitration of the dispute between Gray 
and Cassady.  Gray contends, moreover, that the status 
conferences did not prejudice Cassady inasmuch as there was no 
discovery between the time of the preliminary injunction hearing 
and the time when Gray filed its Motion to Stay the Proceedings. 
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 We agree with the District Court that Gray, through its 
assent to its orders, acted inconsistently with an intent to 
arbitrate.  Gray compares this case with Nino in which we found 
that the defendant waived the right to arbitrate where he actively 
litigated the case for more than 15 months and engaged in “no 
fewer than ten pretrial conferences,” and “extensive discovery.” 
 Nino, 609 F.3d at 199.  However, in Nino we also stated that a 
“case-specific waiver analysis is not susceptible to precise line-
drawing.”  Id. at 212.  Thus, Nino does not establish a base line 
of what must be shown for acquiescence in pre-trial orders to 
waive the right to arbitrate. 
Here, in addition to the three pre-trial conferences, the 
parties at the District Court’s direction, engaged in mediation 
and filed Rule 26(f) discovery reports.  Gray at no point during 
any of these proceedings indicated that it intended to invoke the 
arbitration clause.  Further, the absence of discovery between 
the proceedings on the preliminary injunction application and 
the motion to stay the arbitration does not alleviate the litigation 
expenses, which we discussed above, that Cassady incurred by 
participating in status conferences, the mediation, and the filing 
of a discovery report.  In that regard, Gray’s argument that there 
would have been status conferences even if there had been 
arbitration because the litigation would have continued after the 
preliminary injunction hearing does not address the prejudice 
Cassady suffered inasmuch as Cassady and RWLS are separate 
entities represented by different attorneys in the District Court 
litigation.  Thus, though the judicial proceedings may have 
continued following the denial of the preliminary injunction 
application, even if the Gray-Cassady dispute had been 
arbitrated, Cassady would not have needed to participate in 
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them.  Considering the factors that we have set forth we find 
that Gray’s acquiescence to the District Court’s pre-trial orders 
weighs heavily in favor of finding that Gray waived its right to 
arbitrate this dispute. 
 G. Extent to Which Both Parties Engaged in               
                      Discovery 
 The final Hoxworth factor focuses on the amount and 
scope of discovery in which the parties engaged prior to the 
request for arbitration.  The District Court found that while the 
parties’ engaged in discovery during the preliminary injunction 
proceedings which was closely related to the merits of the 
underlying dispute, the arbitration clause authorized the parties 
to seek preliminary relief without jeopardizing their arbitration 
rights.  Thus, inasmuch as the parties did not engage in any 
discovery after the preliminary injunction hearing, the District 
Court held that the last factor neither weighed in favor nor 
against finding a waiver of Gray’s right to arbitrate. 
 Gray argues that the lack of extensive discovery in this 
case should be a “powerful factor supporting enforcement of the 
arbitration provision in this case.”  Appellant’s br. at 31.  
However, like the District Court, we are not prepared to 
discount completely the preliminary injunction discovery which, 
in this case, was quite extensive: the parties took the depositions 
of eight separate individuals; exchanged extensive written 
discovery responses, including 200 separate interrogatories, 
requests for admission and written document production 
requests; the parties exchanged more than 20,000 pages of 
documents and submitted to the District Court approximately 
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100 pages of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law.14
 
  Further, as the District Court held, the discovery was 
closely related to the merits of the dispute.  Overall, even 
considering the lack of further discovery after the preliminary 
injunction hearing, we agree with the District Court that the 
absence of such discovery, considered from Gray’s viewpoint, at 
best is a neutral factor in a waiver analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 In sum, we find that four of the Hoxworth factors weigh 
in favor of finding that Gray waived its right to arbitrate, one 
factor is neutral and one factor weighs in favor of finding that 
Gray did not waive its right to arbitrate.  Moreover, it is clear 
that Cassady has suffered prejudice as a result of Gray’s delay in 
invoking the arbitration clause.  If the arbitration goes ahead, the 
substantial time and expense that Cassady spent litigating the 
case in the District Court will to some degree need to be 
duplicated in the arbitration despite the fact that the dispute was 
close to proceeding to trial in the forum that Gray itself choose.   
Moreover, we think that the overall circumstances of this 
                                                 
14 Gray argues that Cassady served the majority of the document 
requests and took a majority of the depositions during the 
preliminary injunction proceedings.  In considering the sixth 
Hoxworth factor, however, we look at “the extent to which both 
parties have engaged in discovery.”  Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 927 
(emphasis added) (citing Gavlik, 526 F.2d at 783).   
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case indicate that Gray, through its litigation conduct, has 
waived its right to arbitrate.  From the beginning of this dispute, 
when Gray initiated the lawsuit without mentioning the 
arbitration provision in the New Hire Stock Option Plan to its 
compliance without objection to the District Court’s various 
orders for ten months and its participation in extensive discovery 
and status conferences, Gray indicated, through its conduct, that 
it was choosing to litigate its dispute with Cassady.  It changed 
its strategy from pursuing litigation to demanding arbitration 
only after it substituted attorneys, and it did so without any 
advanced notification to Cassady.  In the meantime, Cassady had 
prepared its litigation strategy in anticipation of a trial in the 
District Court, and in that preparation participated in the 
significant proceedings that we have described and thus incurred 
expenses that would not have been necessary if this case is 
arbitrated.  Considering all that has transpired, whether we 
weigh the Hoxworth factors qualitatively or quantitatively, we 
agree with the District Court that Gray waived its right to 
enforce the arbitration provision contained in the New Hire 
Stock Option Plan.15
                                                 
15 As an alternative argument for affirming the District Court’s 
order to enjoin the arbitration, Cassady argues that the 
arbitration clause is unenforceable.  Inasmuch as we are 
affirming the District Court’s orders denying arbitration on a 
waiver basis, we need not address this argument.   
  Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court’s orders granting Cassady’s motion to enjoin the 
Delaware arbitration and denying Gray’s request to stay the 
judicial proceedings pending arbitration.                
